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"MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW"-A SYNTHESIS
CHARLES V LAUGHLIN*
A genuine service has been recently rendered to the world of
legal thought by the Julius Rosenthal Foundation of Northwestern
University in the publication' of a symposium of Contemporary Ameri-
can Legal Philosophies. "From the friction of minds comes the scintil-
lation of truth.' 2 Although truth cannot be obtained from discourse
alone, one may be aided in determining and understanding crucial
issues by comparing the views of those persons whose opinions are
entitled to deference. If it be assumed that the quest for a philosophy
of law is desirable,3 no better aid can be found than a comparison and
synthesis of the views of those who have given meritorious thought
to the working out of such philosophy. I make no pretense of having
a legal philosophy of my own. I have, however, read the symposium
with great interest and believe that an attempt to extract therefrom
threads of agreement and difference may not be entirely without pur-
pose. While it is hoped that such a study may prove interesting to
those who do not find time to read the entire symposium, it is
primarily desired to arouse sufficient interest to induce others to read
that volume itself.
Sixteen scholars, consisting of fourteen law professors and two
present day philosophers, contributed views. They are as follows: Pro-
fessor Joseph Walter Bingham,4 Professor Morris R. Cohen,5 Professor
Walter Wheeler Cook,6 Professor John Dewey,7 Professor John Dickin-
son,8 Professor Lon L. Fuller,9 Dean Leon Green,' 0 Professor Walter B.
Kennedy," Professor Albert Kocourek,12 Professor K. N. Llewellyn,13
*Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
'By the Boston Law Book Co., Boston, Massachusetts.
*Author unknown.
'Compare the views of Professor Thomas Reed Powell: "My Philosophy of
Law" page 269. All further references, unless otherwise indicated will be to "My
Philosophy of Law." Only page citations will be given.
'Law, Stanford University.
'Philosophy, The Umversity of Chicago.
'Law, Northwestern University.
'Philosophy, Columbia Umversity.
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Professor Underhill Moore,14 Professor Edwin W. Patterson,15 Dean
Roscoe Pound,16 Professor Thomas Reed Powell,17 Professor Max
Radin,' s and Dean John H. Wigmore.19 All contributing parties hav-
ing been introduced by titles and full names, hereafter they will be
referred to simply by their surnames.
An author by author summary of the views presented might prove
advantageous. However, it is believed that an article organized around
the subjects discussed by the various writers will be of greater utility.
At the outset, it may be noted that there is little in the way of con-
flict of views. The variations between the articles principally relate to
the subjects discussed.20 It seems that the different "schools of jrns-
prudence" principally present an assortment of tools to be used in
analyzing legal problems. This thought is brought out by Wigmore
who points out that the disciplines of the analytical, historical and
sociological schools of jurisprudence are not in conflict but are all
useful in solving different types of legal problems.
21
There is, of course, some antagonism. The principal conflict is be-
tween the proponents and opponents of the "realistic" school. Even
there, the conflict seems to hinge largely upon what is meant by legal
realism. One gets a considerably different idea of what the philosophy
of the realist is from reading the views of one of them-such as
Llewellyn-from that obtained by considering the views of a critic-
notably Kennedy. For instance, the impression obtained from an
opponent of the realistic school is that that system considers only
judicial behavior as a fact to be observed, and has no place in its
system of categories for rules of law as a guide to or check upon





"Law, The University of California.
'"Law, Northwestern University.
"In the limited space available some authors have presented the fundamentals
of their legal thoughts. Others have restricted their expositions to a more thorough
consideration of particular fundamentals. To the former group belong Bingham,
Dewey, Dickinson, Green, Kennedy, Llewellyn, Pound, Powell and Wigmore; to the
latter belong Cook, Cohen, Fuller, Kocourek, Moore, Patterson, and Radin.
=Page 314. Is this not also true in connection with philosophy in general? Is
the difference between the various philosophies to be found entirely in a con-
flict among the propositions affirmed and denied, or is it to be found, at least in
part, in the different types of questions toward which interest is directed.
"See Dickinson, page 98.
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rules as one of the parts of the law.23 Is it not frequently true that the
different views one gets as to the tenets of an institution depend upon
whether they are taken from its friends or its enemies? Which gives
the truer picture? Does not the dissenting opinion in a case often tell
us more accurately than that of the majority what was held? It is
suggested that the statement of doctrines of any school of thought
should be taken from those who formulated it, but that its implica-
ions may be more clearly observed by its enemies.
Misgivings have already been indicated as to the utility of trying
to formulate a philosophy of law.2 4 The views of Fuller, Kocourek
and Powell may lend color to such doubts. Fuller feels that one's
philosophy can best be stated in the negative-i.e., by the enumera-
tion of such things in the present system as he opposes. He is especially
antagonistic to two present day attitudes: (i) What he calls "the
literary traditions,"25 "by which he means the tendency of legal teach-
ing to emphasize only such materials as have been traditionally used-
e.g., cases, statutes, etc. (2) The belief that legal problems can be
solved by applying the methods evolved in the natural sciences.
26
Kocourek develops a profound metaphysical dialectic to a fatalistic
conclusion.27 We are told that the parts we play in the great drama
of time were written before time began, and that not one comma can
be changed. It follows that jurists delude themselves when they pur-
port to construct legal systems. It is suggested, however, that our
illusions are to us real, the inference being that, even though our
activity, including the contemplation of legal problems, has been
foreordained, we get as much satisfaction from the appearance of con-
trolling it as we would if we really did have control.
Powell disclaims having a legal philosophy, and regards his think-
ing and writing as a search for understanding rather than an exposition
of a system. 28 He is inclined against generalizations concerning law,
believing that since many legal systems have been advocated, and
since many minds work at solving the legal problems of society, it
cannot be asserted that law is simply this, or simply that. In a search
2Page 183.




2 Page 269. Powell expresses this attitude by saying that" . any drive behind
my legal talk and writing, is merely that of the typical Vermont Yankee whose
frequent expression is 'I want to know.'"
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for solutions of specific problems, help may be taken wherever found;
and by appropriating such of the discipline of one group as may be
helpful in solving a specific problem, Powell does not regard himself
as precluded from obtaining assistance elsewhere when desired. A very
excellent suggestion is made regarding the helpfulness, in studying
any field of law, of emphasizing the work of some specific tribunal in
that field.z
Powell also de-emphasizes the matter of definition. Several of the
other contributors concern themselves with the definition of law, and
of the concept of law, if for no other reason than to guard against con-
fusion. Some are apologetic and protest that they are not primarily
concerned with matters of definition, but none show--so dearly as
Powell-that definition is the least concern of the legal thinker. He
points out that it is not important whether law be defined as in-
cluding "judicial behavior" or "observed social conformity." Whether
those things are elements of law, or not, they are important things to
observe. 0 By way of comment it may be observed that such utility as
the defining of terms may have is only as a first step. Any discipline
which stops with definitions is futile.
"For all a rhetorician's rules
Teach him but to name his tools."8 '
WHAT Is LAw?
A difference must be recognized between an attempt to define the
word "law" and the outlining of one's understanding of the concept
of law. The letter which invited participation in the symposium states
that ".... The contents will deal with views of American thinkers on
the ultimate ideas of the origin, nature or ends of the law.... "82 This
invitation dearly solicited from each contributor an expression of his
views as to what law is, and on such corollary questions as why it
exists and how it came into existence. The most concise statement is by
Radin who declares: "I propose to discuss here the science of legal
values." 3 The most complete outline of the types of problems com-
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ingenious names which that thinker coined for his categories, the out-
line is as follows:
Law may be regarded as:
I. A thing to be ascertained:
x. The actual law at a given moment.
2. Its history.
3. Its relationship to other sciences.
II. A thing to be questioned and debated.
1. Logic may be the standard,
2. or ethics,
3. or sociology.
III. A thing to be taught.
IV. A thing to be made and enforced. This may involve an applica-
tion of:
i. The judicial process, or
2. The legislative process.
The underlying question seems to be: What is law? Cohen, in
emphasizing the principle of polarity as an element of the legal
science, points out that law cannot be regarded either as identical
with justice or as completely divorced therefrom3 4 Some of the writers
have concerned themselves with explaining various concepts of "law,"
while others have devoted their attention to what is comprehended by
the term "Philosophy of Law."
Pound conceives of the term "law" as usable in three senses:3 5
i. As a regime.
2. As a body of precepts.
3. As judicial and administrative processes.
Llewellyn's outline of his conception of law hinges around five
points:6 (i) He regards "Law as a whole" as a "going institution."
(2) This institution is composed in part of rules and principles. (3) In
that connection regard must be had for the ideologies of judges-a
matter rarely recognized in formal opinions. (4) Also law may be re-
garded as practices which give significance to rules, principles and
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Green believes that, although law has many phases, three elements
are involved in its composition: 37 (1) Wisdom, ".. born of the thought
and experience of the ages. " (2) Power-the social power that
radiates through the process of formal government. (3) Processes by
which wisdom and power are utilized.
Are not these classifications substantially similar? Pound's con-
ception of law as a regime, is to be compared with Llewellyn's "going
institution" and Green's view of it as social power. Likewise Pound,
Llewellyn and Green have the same thing in mind, whether called pre-
cepts, or rules, principles or ideologies, or the wisdom of the ages.
Pound and Green both regard the legal processes (judicial and ad-
ministrative) as the third sense in which the word "law" may be used,
which amounts to the same as Llewellyn's fourth and fifth points.
Bingham introduces the element of predictability.38 "What is law,"
he says, "in the sense of the field of our professional study? Is it not
true that in this sense, the law consists of the concrete functioning of
government? The lawyer's business is to forecast as accurately as he
can possible governmental actions with respect to his clients affairs. .."
Bingham is an outstanding realist, and some readers might assume
that the above statement presents the view of the realistic school as to
the true nature of the legal concept.39 No one can deny that the ability
to predict what judical or administrative action will be is the most
important aptitude that a lawyer can have. Pound40 and Radin4' both
emphasize its importance. But how can successful predictions be made,
except by references to legal precepts? Does not the threefold classifica-
tion of law as a regime, as a body of precepts and as legal processes
still stand?
The two philosophical contributors concerned themselves less with
the concept of law than with determining the type of problems with
which a philosophy of law should deal. Cohen believes that a phi-
losophy of law is an attempt to view it as a part of a larger whole4-i.e.,
to determine the relationship between law and the other institutions
or disciplines. In that sense, he says, no fundamental distinction separ-
'wPages 133, 134.
mPage io.
OIt is to be borne in mind that Llewellyn, whose views were summarized above,
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ates a philosophy of law from a science of law.43 Patterson similarly
understands the purpose of a philosophy of law.44 He regards the im-
portant relationships of law as being three in number: "Its relation
with government, with society, and with justice."
45
Dewey believes that the purpose of legal philosophy is to furnish
... the ground upon which existing legal affairs, including rules of
law, the work of legislation, judicial decisions, and administrative
practices, can be legitimately and profitably evaluated... -46 Dewey
predicates his views upon the assumption that there should be some
kind of a standard apart from the rules of law themselves for evaluat-
ing those rules; he brings out that during some periods of history these
extraneous standards have been regarded as found in the law of na-
ture, proceeding from the will of God. I do not regard Dewey's view
as requiring that a philosophy of law consist of standards of evaluat-
ing legal precepts, but as providing a discipline whereby such standards
can be obtained.47
These two analyses as to the purpose of a philosophy of law amount
to the same thing. The only purpose in determining the relationship
of law to other fields of knowledge, is to obtain standards by which
legal precepts may be evaluated. From the foregoing summary of
views as to the nature of the concept of law and the purpose of law,
four questions appear: (i) What is law? In answer to that it was seen
that law might be regarded as (a) an instution, (b) a body of precepts
and (c) the judicial process. (2) Why does law exist? (3) Where does
law come from, or what is its origins? (4) What is the relationship of
law to other fields of knowledge, or by what standard may its precepts
be judged? The bulk of the attention of most of the contributions to
the symposium relate to all or part of these four questions and the
"Page 32. Cohen eliminates a supposed distinction between science and phil-
osophy as follows: "One of the most widespread of these misimpressions is that
philosophy proceeds deductively from intuitive or a priorz first principles, while
science proceeds inductively from an examination of the facts.. (a) No science
can be entirely inductive, and (b) if philosophy were purely deductive it would,
like pure mathematics, be entirely hypothetical and could not assert anything about
law or indeed about any specific form of existence such as mind or nature."
"Page 231.
'Ibid. He classifies his own legal philosophy as pluralistic, because it is not
deduced from any set of self-evident truths, and eclectic because it adopts not one
system of jurisprudence, but draws from many.
"Pages 74, 75.
'2For example, if it be assumed that the propriety of legal rules should be
tested by applying postulates from the discipline of economics, a philosophy of law
would not include the entire field of economics, but would simply direct a jurist to
that field.
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three answers to the first. The various views relating to them will
therefore be discussed.
Law as an Institution
The first answer to the question, what is law, is that it is an institu-
tion, Pound says "a regime," 48 Llewellyn ways "a going institution."
As a "going institution" Llewellyn sees five "jobs" which the law must
do:4 9 (i) Dispose of specific "trouble cases"-wrongs and disputes:
(2) Prevent future trouble by advising people as to what they can
reasonably expect. (3) Allocate authority within the government.
(4) Organize society as a whole so as to give it integration, direction
and incentive. (5) Develop a "juristic method" for performing the
foregoing duties.
Law as a Body of Precepts
Much attention is given to the attitude toward law which regards
it as a set of rules and principles. 50 Cohen makes it dear that law can-
not be identified with what we actually do, but must be regarded as a
set of standards whereby human and governmental conduct may be
judged. Such remarks may be regarded as a repudiation of what some
people believe to be the realist's conception of law. Dickinson states
that life would be intolerable if governmental officials acted without
reference to some body of authoritative principles.51 Such principles he
regards as important for two reasons: (i) They furnish a basis by
which the citizens may predict what governmental action will be in
a specific situation and arrange his own affairs accordingly. (2) They
act as a control or check upon governmental officials, particularly
courts, which prevent them from acting in an arbitrary manner. He
brings out that as a restraint upon government, law is to be regarded
as a form of self restrant.52
Pound prefers the more generic term "precepts," which he regards
as including rules, principles, standards and precepts defining legal
concepts.53 By rules, he means precepts which attach definite legal con-
sequences to detailed situations of fact. Rules are found particularly in
'Page 249: "I think of Law as in one sense a highly specialized form of social
control in a developed politically organized society-a social control through the
systematic and orderly application of the force of such a socAety. In this sense it is
a regime-the regime which we call the legal order.
'Page i84.
WCohen, page 35; Dewey, page 77; Patterson, pages 232, 233.
t Pages 91, 95, 97.
mPage ioo.
3Pages 256, 257.
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the fields of criminal, commercial and property law. Principles, Pound
regards, as "... authoritative starting points for legal reasoning. They
furnish a basis for reasoning when a situation not governed by a pre-
cise rule come up ...." Legal standards ". .. are defined measures of
conduct, to be applied according to the circumstances of each case...."
Such examples are given as "due care," "fair conduct of fiduciaries"
and the "reasonable facilities" that public utilities are required to pro-
vide. Pound regrets that attempts are frequently made to formulate
rules concerning "due process of law" which he regards as a standard.
Rules, principles and standards are stated in terms of legal conceptions
such as "trusts," sales," and "negligence." The remaining type of legal
precepts are such as define these conceptions.
Llewellyn believes that in addition to rules, principles, etc., notice
must be made of judicial ideology-i.e., " .. a body of pervasive and
powerful ideals which are largely unspoken, largely implicit, and
which pass almost unmentioned in the books... "54 Radin's remarks
on page 291 may be regarded as voicing the same idea. I like the term
"inarticulate premises" to describe this matter of judicial ideology.
Bingham recognizes the importance of rules and principles in law, but
emphasized that they must be regarded as ". . tools of thought and
nothing more...."55 Apropos that thought he very excellently points
out the importance of the facts of each case in which a precept of law
may be regarded as having been developed.56 At one time, he states,
emphasis was placed upon generalizations, specific cases being regarded
as important only for purposes of illustration, but that ".... we Ameri-
can realists contend.., that the cases in all their concreteness of
causes and effects are the very substance of the law and that the causes
of judicial decisions are not always stated and often are stated in-
accurately in the judicial opinions .... "57 It may well be remarked that
not only the "realists" entertain such views. They are too sound to be
appropriated by any one school of jurisprudence. Dewey expresses the
same thought 5s when he states that "... what is called application is
"Page 184.
TPage 22.
5Page xi. On page 14 excellent advice is given concerning the teaching of law
by the case system....... At present I want to emphasize that school study of a case
should center on the facts of the case as presenting a problem of government and
the decision, i.e., the court's disposition of the case-as an official solution of that
problem. The opinion (except when it develops expert treatise proportions) is
important only for the light it may throw on the problem and the solutions-not
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not something that happens after a rule or law or statute is laid down
but is a necessary part of them; such a necessary part indeed that in
given cases we can judge what the law is as a matter of fact only by
telling how it operates..."
In connection with the view that legal precepts, as restraints upon
governmental activity, are a form of self restraint,59 it has been well
pointed out that legal norms are not commands to individuals subject
to the law but to the judges who apply it.60 The conduct of individuals
is significant because such conduct provides the operative facts by
which magistrates may determine which of numerous rules of law are
applicable. 6i In that connection Cohen repudiates the notion that law
is a restraint upon individual freedom, pointing out that privileges
and freedom depend upon the existence of restraints upon those in-
dined to interfere with another's freedom.62
Law as Judictal and Admtznstrative Process
The concept of law is also regarded as including the judicial and
administrative process through which legal precepts are put into opera-
tion.m Little attention seems to have been given the legislative pro-
cess.6 Of course, the entire foregoing discussion of precepts must neces-
sarily include those which come into existence through legislation,
because statutes and doctrines are the two great types of legal precepts.
However, a statute is incomplete until it has been applied by ad-
ministrative or judicial officers. Thus the process by which legislation
is enacted can hardly be regarded as representing a meaning of the
term "law."
WHY DoEs LAw Exisr
For what ends is law a means? That problem was presented by
Green as follows: 5 "... It is the function of philosophy to account
for what takes place; to discover the essentials of life and give them
synthesis. How then, can we account for a significant place for law and
lawyers in our social order?" Pound recognizes that according to Kan-
tian epistemology the end of law cannot be ascertained, but states that
ODickinson's view, page ioo. See positions of this article appurtenant to note
52, supra.
OoPoint was made by Bingham at page 18 and Patterson at page 233.
=See Patterson, page 233.
OPages 37, 38.
"Bingham, page 17; Green, 133; Pound, 249.
"Wigmore mentioned the legislative process as one of his categories.
e5Page 131.
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it can be for practical purposes.6 6 Powell realizes that the law has
many ends, many of which are generally assigned, and that".. Men of
many minds could chant the ritual in unison and then go forth to pro-
mote contradictory policies ... ."67 Radin states that the purpose of
law is to determine when the powerful machinery of courts and police
will be invoked.6 8
Dickinson,69 Green, 70 Patterson,71 and Pound72 all start with the
premise that interests and drives of various human beings are in con-
flict. This conflict is generally said to result from the fact of scarcity-
i.e., that the total of human demand exceeds available supply. Green
states that it results from the fact that the first call of life is activity,
from which power is developed. It is then inferred by all that the
power and friction resulting from social activity demands control.
Many controls exist, two of the most common being custom and re-
ligious authority. The most important of these social controls is the
power of secular or political authority which exerts its control through
law.
WHAT ARE THE SouRcEs op LA-*v
The explanations given as to why law exists suggest the further
questions, where does it come from or what is its source. Dickinson
enumerates the three usually assigned sources of law: 73 (i) Custom.
(2) Authority, which may supplement custom or may be in derogation
of it. (3) Ideal law or the law of nature. Dickinson himself regards
custom and authority as being the joint sources of law, although he
believes that wholesome results have come from the attempts of
jurists to determine what the law of nature is. Dewey states that the
use of law of nature as a standard to judge positive law is found only
in philosophies of medieval origin.74 Of the sixteen contributors, only
Kennedy recognized the law of nature as the true and correct source
of the law which we apply in the courts, or should apply.75 His view
is stated as follows:
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recognizes natural law and that a Divine Being is its Author.
Scholasticism strongly believes in the power of Man to reason
and to judge impartially in accordance with his freedom of
will. Scholasticism believes in universal truths and imperish-
able concepts, first principles to guide man in human action...
The contributors generally recognize law as a social phenomenon
with custom as its source. Patterson states that the ".. relation of
law to society is both causal and consequential.. ,"7 while Radin
believes that legal doctrines are derived from a process of generalizing
social patterns and applying agreed social principles. 77 Green recog-
nizes that of the three elements which he regarded as composing law-
i.e., wisdom, power and process-only one, process, presents problems
of law distinct from life and society as a whole. He concludes that a
" philosophy of law must therefore be found in a philosophy of
the total social organism of which law is only one phase..."78
Dewey demonstrates the relationship between custom and social
processes by an interesting figure of each. He likens social process to a
stream and custom to the banks.79 The banks govern the course which
the stream takes and yet, over a long period of time are themselves
modified by the attrition of the running water. So, social processes
are governed by custom, which is, in time, itself modified by those very
processes. He regards custom as the basis of law.
Dewey believes that the purpose of a philosophy of law is to pro-
vide extrinsic standards by which the precepts of law may be judged.
It was for this reason that jurists formerly searched for a "law of na-
ture." But now that is not necessary, because custom furnishes the re-
quired standards. It is a standard which is comparatively stable, and
yet is susceptible to necessary modifications from time to time.
In connection with the social origin of law, there is a point which
was suggested in several of the articles, but which, it seems to me, was
not sufficiently discussed. That is the fact that the customs of which law
grows are not necessarily beneficent. A view of history shows that law
can, and frequently has, been used as an instrument of exploitation.
It is not accidental that the most fundamental type of radical is the
anarchist, or that the term "ruling class" has come to be synonymous
with the concept of an exploiting class. Cohen may have had this
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ing to the will of certain powerful individuals.... "80 Patterson comes
closer to this thought when he suggests that law may be unjust or
socially ill-adapted.8 '
Perhaps one reason the above thought has not been more strikingly
presented is that the fact is not so apparent in present-day England or
in the United States. It is a point, the force of which is seen from his-
tory or from a study of the present cultures of some nations less fortun-
ate than ourselves. Our civilization is sufficiently pluralistic that it is
seldom that any one group can write its will into law,8 2 and a compro-
mise between conflicting interests generally results.
88
Pound regards as one of the important services of the law the
development of a theory of interests.8 4 By this he means that the jurist
must determine which of the numerous interests seeking legal recogni-
tion can make a sufficient showing of benefits rendered to society to
be entitled to such recognition. It is then necessary for law to de-
fine the extent to which such interests will be recognized, and, as thus
defined and limited, to develop techniques whereby they can be
secured. To the claim that it is impossible to arrive at a standard for
evaluating and comparing competing interests, Pound replies that
practitioners have long been availing themselves of practical standards
for that very purpose, and concludes by referring to the famous dictum
of William James that "... the worst enemies of a subject are the pro-
fessors thereof."
The importance of law as a compromise between conflicting social
8*Page s6. This is not exactly the same idea, because one individual may have
sufficient power to formulate law and yet use his power only for humane purposes.
8Page 232.
*This point is well stated by Cohen on page 43 as follows: " most human
beings see the issue of economic justice from the point of view of the class in
which they were born or with which they have been long associated. Thus laborers
identify their interest with that of the people, the middle classes with that of -the
public, and the wealthier classes with that of the country. But the very existence of
class conflicts belies the theory that any class is so omnipotent that the law merely
registers its will. While some classes are doubtless more powerful than others, the
law generally represents a compromise very much like a peace treaty. "
It may be suggested that labor is today wielding an influence over law which
is out of proportion to its economic contribution to society. But it is well known
that this apparently exalted influence would not be possible except for the sympathy
of some members of other groups who feel that the laboring class has not been
treated with entire fairness in the past.
is aspect of the law as an element of compromise is well brought out by
Patterson on page 238.
"Pages 259 to 262. By interests he means demands or desires which human
beings seek to satisfy. The law does not create interests, for they would exist even
if there were no law.
IL941]
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interests introduces another interesting subject-i.e., the importance of
form and its relationship to the concept of justice. Certainly, opposing
forces are not interested in justice except insofar as each may regard
it as synonymous with it own interests. Each element of society desires
to obtain a state of law as favorable as possible to its interests. When a
compromise occurs its form is of the greatest importance. Cohen brings
out the principle of polarity by which he says that we should avoid
either identifying law with justice or as regarding the two as being
completely divorced.8 5 Fuller must have that same thought in mind
when he states that "... . no society will reveal a real and lasting vitality
which is not founded upon institutions which, like contract, reconcile
man's need for form with his need for freedom.. "86 Possibly the
best statement as to the importance of form in the law is that made by
Dickinson as follows:
8 7
"Whenever a reasonably complete and coherent system of
law exists, it necessarily establishes and acts through a structure
of formal jural relations, such as rights, duties, liabilities,
privileges, and the like, between legally recognized entities.
These formal relations are as independent of the actual content
of specific legal rules as the structure of a sentence is independ-
ent of the information which the sentence conveys. They con-
stitute what may be called the grammer of law, and due study
and analysis of them are essential to a correct understanding and
application of legal rules. Such formal relations follow from
the existence of legal rules as inevitably as grammer follows from
language."
The formulas of law often remain the same, even though their
content may change.88 For example, the principle that contributory
negligence on the part of a plaintiff will bar recovery in an action
based upon negligence, is of long standing, although our notion as to
what type of conduct constitutes contributory negligence is con-




wM his point is brought out both by Bingham, page 25, and Radin, 303, 304.
8So far as the form of the law is concerned, courts will not compare the neg-
ligence of the plaintiff with that of the defendant. Yet, however such technical de-
vices as willful and wanton conduct and last clear chance may be rationalized, their
real utility is to ameliorate the doctrine of contributory negligence by allowing
courts to compare negligence. It is a sophistry to say, as many courts do, that will-
ful and wanton conduct is a different type of wrong from negligence. Certainly it is
nothing more than a matter of degree-negligence which strikes the court as more
reprehensible than other negligence. Furthermore, it is difficult to read many per-
"MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW"
It is the formal features of law which most requires the existence
of a legal profession. And conversely the legal profession tends to per-
petuate the technical forms of the law for various reasons, the most
significant of which is that thereby they perpetuate their own craft.90
Several checks upon the tendency of lawyers to insist upon technical-
ities have grown up, the most important being the popular demand
for justice.91
Several of the contributors confessed an inability to define the
concept of justice. Patterson suggests that ". . Perhaps justice is an
occult or mystic something that is left over after one has tried to com-
municate all one's generalizations about human conduct...."9 2 The
best explanation of the meaning of justice was given by Radin,93 which
I regard as his best contribution. He sees the popular notion of justice
as a synthesis of two antagonistic popular emotional drives, a desire
for equality, and a desire for a type of inequality. On the one hand
it is felt that the law should apply equally to all, but at the same time,
all men should be judged according to their deserts and merits. In-
numerable examples come to mind. The vicious man should be
punished, the lazy man ignored and the diligent rewarded. And yet,
all persons must be treated according to the same standards of evalua-
tion. The letter of the law may say that he who has committed murder
must be executed, but there may be some extenuating circumstance
in the case of a particular defendant so that justice will demand that
a lesser penalty be measured out to him. Justice acts as a check upon
formal rules, whether doctrinal or statutory in their origin, but it must
be remembered that the law cannot be identified with justice.
By WHAT STANDARDS SHOULD LEGAL PREcEPTs BE EVALUATED?
By regarding custom as the source of law we have also suggested
answers to the question of relationship, and have considered its re-
sonal injury cases without believing that courts, in determining whether a plain-
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence, consider that question in the light of the
defendant's conduct. An act will be held in case A to constitute contributory
negligence, case A being one in which a defendant was regarded as negligent but
not badly so, whereas, in case B, in which the defendant's negligence was of a
shocking nature the same conduct on the part of the plaintiff as occurred in case
A will not be called contributory negligence.
9°See Radin's discussion on page 296 to 299.
9Ibid. See also Patterson, page 240. Other checks upon extreme legal technical-
ity are legislations, the popular elections of judges, and the desire of judges for
popular approval.
Page 241.
,Pages 299 to 3o3-
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lationship to custom, to powerful interests, to justice. Dewey foresees
the objection that custom is not a sufficient standard by which to
evaluate law because custom itself may be bad. In answer he shows04
that custom itself is changeable, and so, both custom and law are to be
judged by considering their ultimate consequences. But how can law
be judged by its consequences except by reference to other disciplines,
sociology (used in a broad sense to include economics, political science,
etc.), logic and ethics. Thus the third, fourth and fifth problems as
outlined above-i.e., the sources of law, its relationship to other institu-
tions and fields of knowledge, and the standards by which its precepts
are to be judged-merge together, and it becomes important in con-
sidering a standard by which law may be judged, to consider its rela-
tionship to these other disciplines. The most fundamental of these re-
lationships is to the social sciences. It is generally recognized that con-
tributions in those fields should be availed of by the jurist.95 Pound
states that " . the interpretation of legal history is no longer taken
to be the key to the science of law, and economics and psychology have
arisen to furnish universal solvents instead... 96
If law be regarded in its relationship to the social sciences, one of
the most striking problems is whether modem methods of scientific
inquiry are adaptable to the solution of such problems as jurists are
confronted with. Fuller thinks not.97 The objections usually given to
the use of such methods is that techniques of investigation found to be
adequate in the fact sciences are not available in the value sciences
because of an inability to eliminate an emotional element.
Unlike many of the contributors Cook limited himself to one in-
teresting point, that of demonstrating the availability of modem
scientific methods in the solutions of legal problems.98 This he has done
very persuasively. It is generally recognized that only such issues as re-
late to ultimate ends depend upon emotional differences. If a funda-
mental purpose can be agreed upon, the problem as to what means
will best serve that end is strictly a scientific one. Cook shows that
there are really very few "ends" of social conduct, and that most per-
sons agree as to them, and that what people regard as disputes as to
ends really involve only difference as to means, and thus are susceptible
of scientific solutions. He also points out that we do not really know
the ultimate objects for which we strive until we have considered the
"Pages 82, 83, 84.
OSee Llewellyn, pages 192, 193, 1937, Pound, 252, 253, 254.
"Page 258.
"Page 1S8.
"sPages 51, 58 to 63.
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means for carrying them out, and that therefore problems of ends and
those of means are inseparable.
Moore demonstrates99 the feasibility of the use of scientific methods
by outlining a legal theory based substantially upon psychological
processes. He analyzes a learning process based upon pain and reward,
and applies such technique to human responses made to the stimulus
of a published law, such as a "no parking" sign. The effectiveness of
the sign was determined by observing conduct before it was put up and
afterward. The results were tabulated and cast into mathematical for-
mulas.
It is well known that the law, as a system of precepts, is not marked
by complete logical symmetry. Radin points out that the lack of com-
plete symmetry in the law is due, in part at least, to the fact that most
of the acts which the law is required to judge are not performed with
their legal consequences in the minds of the actors. 100 Cohen, however,
refutes any notion that logic forms no part of our legal system. 01 He
criticizes Holmes' famous dictum that "the life of the law has not been
logic, it has been experience" by pointing out that it is a fallacy to as-
sume that logic and experience are mutually exclusive. We know that a
knowledge of fallacies is one of the best contributions made by formal
logic, and thus, Cohenpoints out its value as a means of checking
error in legal reasoning. It would also seem that aptitude in logical
deduction should be necessary to decide the many little questions
with which the jurist is daily confronted. Granting Dewey's thesis that
the basic legal postulates are derived from custom, it does not follow
that there is a specific custom upon which to base a decision in every
case. Those must be solved by logical deduction from such postulates
as have been accepted.
Ethics may also be regarded as useful in furnishing standards for
judging legal precepts. Cohen shows that logic is primarily a check
while ethics, being the science of ultimate human ends, may furnish
law with its basic postulates.10 2 In determining the relationships be-
tween law and ethics both Pound1 03 and Radin'0 4 point out that the
term ethics involves two very different concepts. On the one hand it
may be regarded as presenting an ideal system of morals, inferred either
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from theology or from the social sciences. This is the ethics that people
talk about. On the other hand, the ethics of any particular group may
be inferred from the actual conduct of its members. This view of
morals may give a very different picture from the first. It follows, there-
fore, that when it is considered that law is used in three senses-i.e., as
a regime, as a body of precepts, and as judical processes-and ethics or
morals in two, that there are six possible relationships. The discussions
in the symposium, however, involved principally such principles of
ethics as are accepted by any particular group, and law as a body of
precepts. The other possible relationships should, however, be kept in
mind.
Radin points out1 05 that law and ethics are alike in that they both
involve judgments regarding conduct. In both cases such judgments
are derived from accepted social patterns of conduct. They differ in
two important particulars. Legal judgments are announced by a
definite body of persons, whereas those of a moral nature must be in-
ferred from what members of a group, and particularly its ad hoc
leaders, say and do. Also, there is the important difference as to sanc-
tions. Only legal judgments may be enforced by the powerful pro-
cesses of the law. The two are bound to be interrelated. This is well
stated by Radin as follows: 106
"When legal and ethical judgments differ, when what is
legally permissible is morally reprehensible or what is legally
wrong is morally allowed or even commanded, we may be sure
that the judges-the chief makers of legal judgments-are aware
of it for all their pretense at being indifferent, and any too pro-
nounced or too long continued a divergence between ethical and
legal judgments will not be tolerated."
The most fundamental of the relations of law is to government.
Patterson conceives of government as an".. organized group of in-
dividuals to which the bulk of the population are in a habit of obedi-
ence... "107 As has been seen, law furnishes the principles which
underlie such governmental action as adversely affects the govern-
ment's subjects, which are principles of self restraint, voluntarily as-
sumed. Dickinson points out that there is a public law no less than a
private law.108 The above conception of law, as principles governing
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The current controversy concerning the realistic school especially
relates to the relationship between law and government. Those who
do not regard themselves as members of that group accuse the realists
of holding that law is simply what governmental officials do in fact.
I do not so interpret the essays in this symposium written by those who
are classified as realists. 09 My understanding of their views is that
they differ from those of orthodox jurists only in degree. I do not
believe that they deny that principles and precepts are an important
factor in determining judicial action, and if we are to understand
truly that action we must determine what principles are currently
accepted by the judicial profession. They do make it clear that com-
prehension of principles is not the only way by which judicial action
may be understood.
Many persons are concerned with law, and so, some notice must be
given to those individuals who deal with it in practice. Of the numer-
ous professions" 10 concerned with making, interpreting and applying of
law, the skilled jurist, whether he be judge, practitioner or teacher, is
the most important. The necessity for specially trained practitioners is
especially important when the signficance of the formal side of law
is considered. The necessity of a legal profession is well stated by
Green as follows:"'
"If such analysis and synthesis are valid, then (i) in order to
understand, preserve, and utilize the accumulated wisdom and
experience of the ages, (2) in order to serve society through
the control of its enormous social power, and (3) in order to
operate successfully the processes which have been developed
for that control so as to bring them to bear upon the activities
of every-day life, as well as to fashion new processes, the social
organization requires a large body of highly trained citizens
who are devoted to those ends. Here, it is believed, are found
the functions which give adequate justification for men who
profess the law."
In considering the work of the lawyer, the importance of his func-
tions of predicting future legal actions must again be mentioned and
emphasized. Radin points out that the attorney predicts the course
of judicial action, but that he has a hand in shaping the very action,
the course of which he must forecast.
112
'ONotably Bingham and LIewellyn.
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Llewellyn sees a cleavage between the work of the attorney and
that of the judge. The magistrate is not concerned with prediction,
but with arriving at a just result.Ml 3 It might seem, Llewellyn admits,
that by allowing a judge to be governed by other factors than those
precedents and precepts to be found in law books, however it might
promote justice, would entail the vice of rendering law uncertain. He
believes, however, that the existence of an established technique for
arriving at a result will make the law more certain, rather than less so.
In supporting that view he starts with the premise that if a particular
rule is dear, wise and applicable to the case to be decided, there is no
antagonism between the judge's task of reaching a just result and the
practitioner's burden of forecasting what decision will be made. It is
just for a court to apply such a rule, and is feasible for an attorney
accurately to predict that the court will do so. Thus, by striving to
keep the law ever synonymous with justice, all the uncertainties result-
ing from the varying personal equations of particular judges will tend
to disappear and we will have a legal system which is just, stable,
certain and sufficiently flexible to satisfy the changing needs of society.
2'Pages 19o, 191.
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